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Reflexive Realism in René Clément’s Forbidden Games  
Or ce qui m’est arrivé cette nuit-là et qui sur l’instant m’a ému jusqu’aux larmes, c’était à la fois comme une pensée et comme une preuve, c’était la pansée qu’il n’y a pas de règne, ni de l’homme ni de la bête, mais seulement des passages, des souverainetés furtive, des occasions, des fuites, des rencontres.—Jean-Christophe Bailly​[1]​

I.	Thought and Proof 
This essay examines figural and physical incursions into fictional space-time in René Clément’s neorealist film Forbidden Games/ Les Jeux interdits (1952) by the figures and bodies of animals, in particular the body of one little dog, Jock. These incursions extend to the film’s other frames: that of genre, narrative point-of-view, as well as to what may be called the film’s historical and ethical frameworks. Beginning with a German air raid on a civilian convoy feeling from Paris in June 1940, Jeux interdits centers on the newly orphaned Paulette (Brigitte Fossey). Carrying her dead dog Jock, Paulette meets the farmer’s boy Michel Dollé (Georges Poujouly). Paulette and Michel spend their time building an animal cemetery, which they furnish with creatures big and small, and stolen crosses. When their deeds are exposed, the Dollés hand Paulette over to the Red Cross in the film’s closing scenes.  
Paulette’s “dead dog will command a far greater portion of the little girl’s sorrow than the corpses of her parents, which she must leave behind at the side of the road” (Bazin 135). If the dying dog (who remains uncredited) in the film’s memorable opening scene of the Luftwaffe attack affects us more vividly and more deeply than the deaths of humans, this is because, as Vivian Sobchack has argued, we know that the dog is not playing dead, and this unsettles the boundaries of the fictional world of the film. Being so moved, our response mirrors that of the five-year old Paulette, though our reasons are different.​[2]​ The erosion of boundaries between the staged but real spectacle of animal vulnerability, and the other staged but unreal profilmic events helps to think through the peculiarity of cinematic animals, which, as Jonathan Burt claimed, mark an “extreme collapse between the figural and the real.”​[3]​ 
This doubling of the animal, as indexical imprint and symbol, recurs in Jean-Christophe Bailly’s extended essay on animals, Le Versant animal (2007), published in English as The Animal Side (2011), in the dual form of “thought” and “proof.” Animals are immanence and flesh, but living flesh itself is an articulation and a working out, and so, in fact, thought: “the suspicion arises that an animal itself is or might be something like a thought.”​[4]​ Here Bailly may have in mind Lévi-Strauss assertion that “animals are good to think.”​[5]​ But animals do not merely inspire human thought, or awaken human subjectivity. If animals are “something like a thought,” then life itself is the fleshing out or the extrapolation of “mind,” each life its own conjugation of being. Bailly pursues the parallelism of life and thought in the work of Rilke, Jakob von Uexküll, and Heidegger, as well as Bataille and Deleuze, in order to return to animals the richness (and dignity) that Heidegger deemed their lives lacked. 
The ontological mode of animal life-thought is “pensivity.” Animal pensivity (La pensivité des animaux​[6]​) is neither self-reflection and reason, nor their absence. If animals are proof and thought, evidentiary and reflective, and if the animals in Jeux interdits, too, are “something like a thought,” what sort of thought are they? Moreover, how might pensivity as a modality of being and thinking help to illuminate the film, whose protagonists are children, whose own lives revolve around their encounters with animals, living and dead? 
For Bailly, the overlaying of proof and thought is crystallized in the animal encounter that challenges human exceptionalism. Animals both demonstrate and make possible the knowledge that there is “no supremacy, neither of humans nor of beasts, that there are only passages, fleeting sovereignties, occasions, escapes, encounters.” To follow Bailly is not, therefore, to offer a reading of Clément’s representations of animals (representations that are ultimately banal), or to interpret the film through its animal figures. What follows is occasioned by rather than integral to the straightforward meaning of animals in Jeux interdits. To the extent that the film’s animals are visually prominent, it is difficult to write about them. Animal life disappears as soon as it is put to use in the service of the film’s chief preoccupations: the relations between adult reality—specifically war—and the world of children, and the superficially antithetical genres of the war film and the children’s film. To retrieve from the film’s doubly instrumental attitude to animals (as symbols in the film-world, and as pawns of the production itself) a different resonance, what Bailly calls “some small discrepancy”​[7]​ of the animal encounter, it is necessary to read beyond, even counter to, the film’s explicit logic of displacement, by which mourned animals simply stand in for the mourning of humans under the intolerable shadow of war. 

II.	Etiquettes of the Real 
Proof and thought graph neatly onto the cinematic axes of documentary and fiction that collide (or collapse) at the point where questions of reality and realism emerge. In Carnal Thoughts, Sobchack discusses the different codes that govern the representation of death in moving images. The sequence of rabbit shooting in Jean Renoir’s The Rules of the Game/ La Règle du jeu (1938) interrupts fictional space by introducing the actuality of animal death: “it is a real rabbit we see die in the service of the narrative and for the fiction. The human character who dies, however, does so only in the fiction.”​[8]​ “For me,” Sobchack writes,
the rabbit’s onscreen death was—and still is—a good deal more shocking and disturbing than the death of the human character. And this, I would maintain, is because the rabbit’s death ruptures the autonomous and homogenous space of the fiction through which it briefly scampered. Indeed, its quivering death leap transformed fictional into documentary space, symbolic into indexical representation, my affective investment in the irreal and fictional into a documentary consciousness charged with a sense of the world, existence, bodily mortification and mortality, and all the rest of the real that is in excess of fiction.​[9]​ 

Although information on the fate of the real Jock is vague, Clément, like Renoir, manipulates animal bodies in the midst of the fiction in the service of realism.​[10]​ As Paulette cuddles Jock in her arms, the dog’s legs quiver and twitch, and we know he has died [figure 1].

Figure 1. Paulette and Jock on the bridge after the bombing 

Whether or not the scene depicts the actual death of the dog is not my immediate concern. I am interested instead in one type of onscreen movement, which for Sobchack is particularly charged: the quivering in the scene from Renoir that transforms fictional space. Clément repeats this motion in Jock’s leg spasms as he dies in Paulette’s arms. The reflexive jerking at the indeterminate moment of death palpably breaches the actuality-fiction divide. It is a gesture that, like Sobchack, many viewers of Jeux interdits find uniquely moving. I will later return to the importance of these animal motion reflexes: the spontaneous twitching and flinching that unsettle the frame and constitute something like a “reflex arc” of film, in juxtaposition to Agamben’s humanistic cinema of gesture. Before doing so, it is important to think through the transformation from fiction to documentary that Sobchack describes. 
Whereas for Sobchack animal death finally transcends fiction by investing it with “a sense of the world, existence… and all the rest of the real that is in excess of fiction,” onscreen animal violence seems to me often to function in the opposite way, securing the fictional realm as the hallmark of human expression and thus maintaining a stable human-animal divide.  
The respective ethics of documentary and fiction are chiastic: in wildlife filmmaking, for example, the real must not be (seen to be) staged or directed, and violence—associated with the raw state of “nature”—takes place without human intervention. In the fiction film, the reality of art—associated with the exceptional state of “man”—demands intervention and dramatic direction. What constitutes reality in one mode cancels it out in the other: the validity of fiction as a form of human expression is confirmed through the actual killing of animals, not least when this killing is used to critique violence (against humans). In the violent act, hierarchical distinctions between humans and animals are reinforced.​[11]​ The reality of staged animal violence or death confers on film the seriousness and integrity of its artistic intentions. In the wildlife or natural history film, it is the inherent violence of nature that upholds the hierarchical distinction between humans and animals. The real violence visited on animals in Jeux interdits is therefore highly contrived; as staged and real, its role is not to transcend but to enhance the fiction, to lend it validity as unreal—as art. 
	Documentary and fiction, then, accrue their “reality value” in inverse ways. We are not dealing here with the presence or absence of reality, but with opposing etiquettes of the real. In the absence of an ontological divide between documentary and fiction, each filmic mode seeks to construct and honor the world of its making as a matter of etiquette. 

III.	Unflinching
Clément’s early training as a documentarian is evident in his first feature The Battle of the Rails/ La Bataille du rail (1946), on the sabotaging of the German war effort by French Resistance railway workers. The neorealism of Jeux interdits borrows as freely from Eisensteinian montage (referenced in the first bombing sequence) as it does from French farce. The film’s oblique treatment of WWII sets it apart from the conventional war film. In its focus on marginal beings (children, peasants, and animals) and fleeting events (Paulette’s stay with the Dollé family is short lived; in the final scene at a Red Cross refugee center, Paulette disappears from view calling out for Michel), Jeux interdits may in fact tell us more about war than its generic counterparts. 
What do dogs know of war? Does Jock’s death contribute something to our understanding and critique of war? A similar question arises in the nonfictional context of the so-called “Liepaja film,” less than two minutes of footage shot by German army officer Reinhard Wiener in July 1941 at the scene of a mass execution of Latvian Jews by the Einsatzgruppen. In the Wiener film a small dog suddenly appears in the frame: “[f]or a fleeting instant, the dog’s body registers the shock of the gunfire, while the crowd that has come to watch—or at least be present—at [sic] the execution stands mostly motionless, stilled by their spectatorial fascination with and moral unconcern for what has just happened.”​[12]​ If the twitching of Clément’s little dog punctures the fictional frame of Jeux interdits, the startled gesture of the Liepaja dog imbues the documentary footage with an uncertain, speculative quality. The dog’s presence and behavior raise questions about the “crisis of witnessing”​[13]​ made palpable by the Liepaja film.   
It is not the similarity between the two dogs that is striking (they could both be Jack Russell terriers, with light fur and dark patches), or the films’ strange mirroring of one another—Clément’s dog is present in a dramatization of human mass killing; the Liepaja dog is on the scene of an actual massacre. It is not even the shared elements of performance, staging, and shooting, or the necessity of an audience (the bystanders in Liepaja, and us, the cinema viewers in Clément). What is remarkable is that in both films, the colossal event of war is haunted by the negligible presence of a dog, whose very marginality allows for a different contemplation of war. 
	In “Who Was ‘the Last Kantian in Nazi Germany’? Towards a Prehistory of the Postanimal,” David Clark notes that, unique among scholars of the Liepaja film, the historian David Marwell sees the dog: “what catches Marwell’s discerning eye is the uncanny arrival of an animal, a little dog, who darts excitedly across the foreground of the field of view at the moment that the executioners’ guns go off.”​[14]​ Clark asks whether we could we consider the dog as a witness, and if so, “what burden does the apparition of this animal bear?”​[15]​ “Can an animal witness atrocity?”​[16]​ Clark’s answer is that to deny the dog the possibility of witnessing not only rehearses the old philosophic disavowals that define animals as lacking in capacities (of thought, agency, morality, language, and so on), but it also misconceives the nature of testimony as a form of being-for-the-other which does not trade in facts, information, or evidence. Thus Clark, like Bailly and Derrida, wants to salvage nonhuman being from the impoverished ontologies that European philosophy, and, one ought to add, European politics tainted by genocide, has forced upon animals. “A thoughtlessness, an ‘animal’ witlessness, let us say, in honor of the dog who flinches—without reflection and without needing to reflect—at the sudden sound of the gunfire, and whose flinching proves to be otherwise than a privation.”​[17]​ Read beyond privation and lack, the dog’s response makes possible nonhuman witnessing as that which is “known” without being articulated, understood with one’s body without being fully thought; beyond the taxonomies of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders, the dog speaks—speaks to and for us—of the unspeakable. 
	Like Jock in Jeux interdits, the Liepaja dog “has the potential to interrupt” established ways of seeing and thinking.​[18]​ For Clark, the dog may be the “accidental witness” par excellence, embodying not just the precarity of the lives that are violently extinguished but of the event of witnessing itself that may be lost or go unheeded. On the one hand, Clark explains, the “creature’s reflex reaction expresses or seems to express a lack of consciousness, which in turn is available as a figure for a lack of conscience,”​[19]​ making the presence of a domestic pet at the site of the murders nothing more than the cruelest of jokes. On the other hand, “the dog reacts viscerally where no one seems willing or able to respond morally.”​[20]​
There are a number of ways of thinking through the testamentary force of the animal moment in the Liepaja film. For me, in the context of this piece, the dog’s reflexive response disrupts the supplementary chain of human exceptions that sets, and resets, “us”—highly contingent in the purview of genocide—apart from the beasts. Like language, or reason, moral judgment or tool use, “witnessing” can piously shore up human exceptionalism, when, ironically, what witnessing bears witness to in this case is the genocidal logic that singles out the “human” in the first place; a bearing witness to the human as a false universal. The dog-as-witness undoes human exceptionalism in the anticipation of a different ethos, a different community. “Perhaps it takes a nonhuman animal, this animal,” Clark writes, “darting about this blood-soaked sand-dunes on the outskirts of Liepaja, to throw into relief the limitless violence of that ‘anthropocentric conceit,’ and the limitless interdependencies that await us in a more frankly ethical (post)human world.”​[21]​
A second undoing, as Derrida’s “The Animals that Therefore I Am,” is quick to remind us, is of the distinction between response (mechanical and mindless, that is: animal) and reaction (self-conscious and mindful, so human). At the moment of animal flinching, something in us realizes that the distinction between the thoughtful and unthinking, on which is erected the entire moral humanist edifice of civilization and barbarism, fails to account for the atrocities we are watching. For it is precisely the infinitesimal difference between reflex and reflection that the dog of Liepaja testifies to, which is why the dog’s image, if we choose to acknowledge it, cannot fail to affect us. 
The dogs in Clément and in the Liepaja film do not belong. In Clément, as already discussed, the dog embodies displacement (displacing Paulette’s true loss of her parents), and functions as a guarantor of cinematic merit (for us, consumers of the serious art film). In Liepaja, the dog must remain, to borrow Judith Butler’s term, “unframed” and unseen, his/her presence ascribed to chance and quickly dispatched. But the involuntary responses of nonhuman animals in both films—and the equally involuntary human responses to those responses—pertain to the medium’s grounding in gesture over representation. In their treatment of the Second World War, furthermore, the films call attention to the dissolution, or destruction, of gesture at the moment of a catastrophic breakdown of modern European civilization.
In “Notes on Gesture,” Agamben proposes a philosophy of film, influenced by Deleuze,” that reconfigures cinema as gestural rather than imagistic.​[22]​ The image is frozen and fixed, while the gesture is movement and action. But, even as action, “[w]hat characterizes the gesture is that in it nothing is being produced or acted, but rather something is being endured and supported. The gesture, in other words, opens the sphere of ethos as the more proper sphere of that which is human.”​[23]​ The gesture is not directed toward any particular end by representing purposive activity. It gestures the gestural as pure medium, as a mode of communicability without content (resembling Levinasian saying), and so is inherently ethical and political, that is intersubjective and communal: “the gesture is… communication of a communicability. It has precisely nothing to say because what it shows is the being-in-language of human being as pure mediality.”​[24]​ Because being-in-language exceeds any particular linguistic formation, “the gesture is essentially always a gesture of not being able to figure something out in language.”​[25]​ The relation between gesture and witnessing as modes of communicability on the threshold of verbal expression is clear enough. The gesture “allows the emergence of the being-in-medium of human beings, and thus opens the ethical dimension for them”; “what is relayed to human beings in gestures is not the sphere of an end in itself but rather the sphere of pure and endless mediality.” ​[26]​ Yet what is it about the fundamental vital expressiveness of gesture that limits it to human beings? The “human” in this essay gives the impression of an uneasy insertion, an add-on that brackets off the gesture from a more general mediality in order to secure human chosenness. The problem with the designation “human” in “Notes on Gesture” is that it fails to gesture in precisely the way Agamben intends: it operates as a means to an end of human exclusivity, and so betrays pure mediality. 
By reserving gesture as exclusively human, Agamben forecloses the possibility of a more-than-human ethos that communicates and communes within and across species. An anthropocentric reading of gesture ignores the fundamental mediality of all life (from rudimentary biological systems based on the transmission of biochemical signals, to the complex sentient life forms privileged by humans, and even to so-called nonliving systems where data is distributed across information interfaces). A truly gestural cinema would fall short if it refused to account for the fundamental gestural structure of life as such. 
The involuntary reflexes in Clément and the Liepaja film push gestural film towards a broader expressivity of the living. Beyond anthropocentrism, as ciné-malité, film is not only gestural but reflexive; its mediality is not restricted to human being-in-language, but opens onto expression and communicability beyond the human. 

IV.	Pensivity, Childhood, and Film
And in these moments of nakedness, under the gaze of the animal, everything can happen to me, I am like a child ready for the apocalypse.—Jacques Derrida​[27]​ 

“I would like to have a video camera set up,” says Bailly at the opening “shot”—this is a text that begins like a movie—of The Animal Side, “one that could position itself on this narrow uphill road (a camera that would know what to do, that would film a car speeding off into the night) and follow me. This is one of those moments of relationships—between consciousness and the countryside, between the speed of a point in motion and the space around it…the road becomes an estuary in which one is moving upstream…. Even if one is not speeding, there is a pure cinematic sensation of irreversible thrust, headlong flight forward, gliding.”​[28]​ One is initially tempted to list the films in which a car snakes it way up the road in the dark, only to realize that the sequence does not belong in this film or that but is quintessentially cinematic. For Bailly, in the following passage, cinema becomes a three-way meeting between the mechanics of surveillance, the central consciousness of a human subject (cocooned in the carapace of the moving automobile), and the sudden disruption of an animal: “someone emerges—a phantom, a beast, for only a beast can burst forth in this way. A deer has come out of the undergrowth; frightened, it runs up the road, trapped between the hedgerows…. It rushes ahead, just as it is, just as it has to be—fear and beauty, quivering grace, lightness.”​[29]​ Again, a reflexive quiver marks the encounter that allows the worlds of humans and animals to be momentarily glimpsed and touched, “yes, touched with me eyes, despite the impossibility” (Bailly 2). 
The impossible is not merely the synesthetic tactility of sight—touching with one’s eyes—but the abyss that Bailly (like Derrida) posits between humans and animals, which is never fully crossed. In place of a breaching of boundaries in which human and animal become copresent, there is tentative, timid “contact, always singular and always consisting of touch, that is the ordinary mode of the bond between them and us—something scarcely formed, always nascent” (Bailly 5). Indeed, one aspect of contact-as-touch involves the partiality and unreliability of feeling one’s way in the dark. The touching described by Bailly departs from the tradition Derrida critiques in his book on Jean-Luc Nancy as “haptology,” since it does not seek to make readily present the one who is touched.​[30]​ Touch is not, then, a mode of verification but a relation that avoids immediacy and totalization; it too is something between thought and proof.​[31]​ 
The abyss between humans and animals echoes Derrida’s second hypothesis in “The Animal That Therefore I Am” concerning the “limit as rupture or abyss between those who say ‘we men,’ ‘I, a man,’ and what this man among men who say ‘we,’ what he calls the animal or animals.”​[32]​ Derrida’s argument is directed both against Heideggerian humanism (where the abyss that separates human from animal is absolute and essential), and biological continuism, of the kind that inflects some “new materialist” relational ontologies that treat all bodies and objects as networked together in more or less horizontal arrangements of comingling matter. The abyss for Bailly and Derrida is not a border but an enumeration of borders. As Derrida puts it, 
The discussion becomes interesting once, instead of asking whether or not there is a discontinuous limit, one attempts to think what a limit becomes once it is abyssal, once the frontier no longer forms a single indivisible line but more than one internally divided line, once, as a result, it can no longer be traced, objectified, or counted as single and indivisible.​[33]​

The Animal Side is precisely such a reflection on “what a limit becomes once it is abyssal.” Cinema recurs in this text as a way of seeing and thinking—evidentiary and reflective—that affirms the melancholy bond between humans and animals, a bond which Bailly describes, after Bataille, as “lost intimacy.”​[34]​ As a capturing and enframing device, cinema is both a revealer and creator of worlds. This “worlding” function, to use Donna Haraway’s term in another context, allows cinema to actively make (or make up) multiple worlds that for Bailly come into being at the point of liminal difference between human and nonhuman being, where an opening is present at the very point of hermetic enclosure. 
In its melancholy configuration of animals Bailly’s ontology of the animal as “the great other, the first companion”​[35]​ strikes me as still anthropocentric, even as it seeks to return to animals what has been stolen from them by a strident humanism that denies animals their place in the world, if only the form of disappearance and loss. But I am less interested here in critiquing Bailly’s residual humanism than in the seismic force Bailly associates with animals to alter “minded” topographies and set thinking off-course, a capacity that is closely linked to image-making. Such a shifting of the terrains of the mind is conveyed by the French word “versant”: the sloping or tilting of thought brought about by the animal encounter. 
The tilting of thought is pictured by Bailly as an opening unto the interim space of pensivity. Pensivity is neither abstract reasoning with which humans are allegedly uniquely endowed nor the stupor usually attributed to animals. Animals mark a “pensive path” [la voie pensive] (Bailly 15) that links what is thought of as thought (self-reflection) in humans, construed as lack (dimness and dumbness) in animals, and as a gift (spontaneity and immediacy) in children, namely their innocence.  
Pensivity may well describe Paulette’s being-in-the-world of Jeux interdits that is neither mindless nor innocent. Moreover, how can pensivity, characteristic of this strange film as a whole, help explain its awkward place in the history of French cinema? The film’s oddities, from its generic misalliance, to its auteurist indistinction, its moral and historical ambiguities, or its initial dismissal by the proponents of the Nouvelle vague, suggest something offbeat and lopsided, and a concern with marginality, most obviously the children’s, but also of the poor, abject peasants, whose relation to the war is oblique.​[36]​ 
Obliqueness affects the demarcations of genre: Jeux interdits is not a children’s film, a war film, or an animal film. Clément surveys these conventional genres as an animal gazes our into Rilke’s open. The film’s generic overtures are tentative and misleading. The opening sequence of the German bombardment seems to promise convention, but by the end of the scene the drama has shifted from the realm of history (and the war movie), to the realm of the child. The self-proclaimed global dimensions of a “World War” are recalibrated to those of a child’s universe. The direction, too, is scaled down and tight: “the film’s terse suggestiveness,” writes Peter Matthews, is like a short story, “slight” in the best possible way: “Forbidden Games is a distinctly slender work. Which is to say that it’s exactly scaled to the intimate, laconic universe of children.”​[37]​ From this point on, the rest of the film will be a little bit skewed, made to fit, not a child’s point of view but the coordinates of a child’s world. Instead of inhabiting the child’s world, the omniscient camera confirms that this world of the child exists. This is a world apart from the film’s other worlds of the feuding peasants, and most importantly, of the war that announces the film’s false start, then gradually recedes from view. 
Far from essentializing childhood as either innocent or as casually cruel, the film adjusts its dimensions to the world of children. This rescaling takes place through the five-year old Paulette. Michel is ten, and his world, though still intersecting with hers, is already drifting towards adolescence. Animals are central to the world of the children, from the old barn owl (the Mayor), to the chickens and bees who end up in Paulette and Michel’s cemetery. The film’s preoccupation with marginal beings—children and animals—without recourse to the conventional children or animal film—is what makes possible the modifications of worldhood. 
In his essay on Jeux interdits André Bazin compares the film to two archetypes of the children’s film. Nikolai Ekk’s Road to Life (1932) and Emil and the Detectives (1931) conform to a “traditional ethical mythology”,​[38]​ in which in “a Manichaeistic universe, the child represents the forces of good.”​[39]​ Both films illustrate “a certain belief in the ‘original innocence’ of children. Evil in a child’s world (whether moral or physical, and especially when the child becomes a martyr to his misdeeds) is the supreme moral scandal. Hence there is no ‘guilty’ or ‘bad’ child, only a ‘delinquent,’ ‘misguided,’ or ‘unhappy’ one.”​[40]​ Clément’s film, on the other hand, eschews such moral mythology. It 
wants to have these two children occupy a place, in a story whose protagonists they happen to be, that is essentially identical to the one adult characters might have occupied. Their actions, their manner, what we can grasp of their thought, are not at all the reflections of an a priori idea about childhood. Michel and Paulette are neither good nor bad children: their behavior, which is by no means absurd, has to do only with psychology, and not in the slightest with morality. It is the adults, to whom the logic of Michel and Paulette’s games is foreign, who project upon them a moral significance.​[41]​

What looks like morality or immorality (goodness or badness) is an adult imposition that perceives childhood only in hindsight. This is illustrated in Jeux interdits’ anti-clericalism, its exposure of the phony, and petty, morality of the village priest and his congregation. Looking back as adults, we tend to idealize, condemn, or see childhood teleologically as “just a phase.”​[42]​ Bazin’s emphasis in the passage on place and placing suggests that Paulette and Michel inhabit a world of their own whose measures and meanings are free from prefabricated adult definitions. “The so-called pessimism for which Clément has so often been reproached…is in reality nothing more than the director’s refusal to insert his child characters into the moral framework by which we would like to define them. There is only one realism: the equal rejection of moral pessimism and optimism.”​[43]​ 
“As near as possible, Clément maintains the integrity of childhood—its aloofness, its impenetrability, its silence, which, beheld from the outside, can appear sinister.”​[44]​ Clément shoots childhood from the outside, as it were, so that its contours become visible. The periphery reveals the truth of the center. Childhood in this film is not simply portrayed as a victim of war, as would be the case in the conventional war and children’s film. Instead, childhood offers a critique and a perspective adjacent to and competing with war. But in grounding the film in the world of the children, another world—the world of the animals—remains untold and unseen. The ambiguous enterprise of the animal cemetery—we suspect, along with Paulette, that Michel produces animal corpses in order to bury them—rehearses the instrumentality that mars the use of animals in film, including this film. The spectacle of animal vulnerability in the opening scene confirms the film’s ambivalent commitment to the real in the staging of actual harm. What remains, I have tried to suggest, is the nervous twitch of the dog—and the film—a testimonial spasm, or reflex, that calls into question Clément’s own forbidden games.   
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